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THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT APPLIED TO
HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS:
GEARING UP FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
Adam G. Sn1yder"
INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 1995, the Clinical Practices of the University of
Pennsylvania (CPUP) entered into a settlement agreement with the United
States whereby CPUP agreed to pay a total fine in excess of $30 million.'
The agreement represented a settlement of various claims and allegations
under the Civil False Claims Act,3 and other acts, including the Program
Fraud Civil Remedies Act4 and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law.5 One-
third of the $30 million fine will go to "restore" the Medicare Trust Fund.
As the dust settles from the CPUP experience, physicians, hospital
administrators, and health lawyers are moving forward with an eye toward
formal compliance with the various fraud laws.
In 1994, Medicare expenditures reached $162 billion and are expected
to climb as high as $259 billion by 1998.6 Estimates of the General
Accounting Office (GAO) indicate that as much as 10 percent of all
Government expenditures are being siphoned out of the system due to
fraudulent and abusive practices.7 Ever since the Attorney General named
health care fraud as the second highest priority after violent crime, the
*AttomeyInslee, Best, Doezie & Ryder, P.S., Bellevue, WA. BA, Boston, Univeroty, 1990; JD,,
Seattle University School of Law, 1995; LL.M. in Health Law, Loyola UniverLih Chicago Shal of
Law, 1996.
2 SETTLEMENTAGREEMENT, December 12, 1995, p.1.
'1 U.S.C. § 3729, et. seq. (1995)
4 31 U.S.C. § 3801, et. seq.(1995)
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a. (1995)
'John C. West, The False ClaiisAc: PotenialLiabilitvforHealthJ Care Proridcrsfor Fraud
andAbuse andBeyond, 28 J. HEALTH &HOSP. LAW 15 (1995) (citing Roger C. Henderon, The
Tort ofBad Faith in FirstParylnsurance Transactions: Refining the Standard of Culpability and
Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1992)).
7 Id (citing GAO, Health Insurance: Vulnerable Payers Lose Billions to Fraud andAbusc, at 1).
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Department of Justice (DOJ) has recovered fines in excess of $600
million.8
Given the Government's stated position, its view on health care fraud,
and its success in obtaining settlements, it naturally follows that the number
of investigations by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the number
of prosecutions by the DOJ will continue to increase.9 A flurry of new
investigations and settlement demands are expected, despite OIG
announcements that budget constraints are restricting audit and
investigative activities.'" If actual physical investigations do become
limited due to funding, it can be expected that investigations will still be
pursued through utilization of computer auditing software.
Astute health care providers with the proper foresight may find shelter
from the current regulatory enforcement storm by developing "effective
corporate compliance programs."" Generally, an effective compliance
program can detect internal criminal activity, serve as a mitigating factor
to a corporate criminal sentence, and, perhaps most importantly, can
influence a U.S. Attorney to decide against indicting the corporation."2
Implementing a compliance program providers protection to a health
care enterprise. In the face of potential prosecution, an effective
compliance plan can serve as a "deterrent" to prosecution, and an
"incentive" to prosecutors to search for a less compliant organization.
This article will focus on recent developments in the law and in the
Government's enforcement efforts that serve as motivators for developing
and implementing an "effective corporate compliance program."' 3 Prior
to discussing the advantages and disadvantages of implementing a
' See Id. (citing BNA, Justice Announces $411 Million Recovered in Medical FraudProbes,
BNA Washington Insider, October 12, 1994).
' Lisa M. Rocelli, BillingFraud, ReimbursementAmong Top Medicare Legallssues in 1996, 5
BNAHEALTH L. REP. at 151 (Feb. 1, 1996).
10 BNA, IG Brown Outlines Effects of Budget Problems on Audits, Investigations, 5 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. at 151(Feb. 1, 1996).
" BNA, Advantages of Corporate Compliance Plan in "Age of Fraud" are Touted, 4 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 42 (Apr. 6, 1996).
12 Dan K. Webb and Steven F. Molo, Some Practical Considerations in D,.veloping gffeetive
Compliance Programs: A Frameworkfor Meeting the Requirements of the Sent cncing Guidelines,
71 WASH. U. L. Q. 375,376 (1993).
13 United States Sentencing Commission, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 (Comment, note
3(k)) (1995) (hereinafter "U.S.S.G.").
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compliance program, an analysis of current law will be provided. The
analysis will focus on recent cases and settlements, between the Federal
Government and various institutions, in an effort to illuminate the
hazardous nature of the regulatory environment in which hospitals and
other health care providers operate.
Next, this article will discuss the development and implementation of
health care institutions' compliance plans. This article will attempt to offer
insight into ongoing investigations; and the article will consider
Intermediary Letter 372, its relevance to compliance programs specifically,
and the effect of the recent teaching physician "clarification" regulations
that became effective July 1, 1996.14 The concluding sections serve as a
general model for compliance that the DOJ should use to issue a formal
policy statement regarding compliance. If a health care institution agrees
to take specific steps toward compliance the provider should be free from
prosecution absent deliberate attempts to defraud the Government.
CORPORATE LIABILITY AND RELEVANT
ENFORCEMENT STATUTES
The first step in developing an effective compliance program is to identify
the specific laws and regulations that require compliance and to analyze the
scope of potential liability thereunder. These laws and regulations provide
a benchmark for assessing a health care institution's current level of
corporate compliance.
Corporate criminal liability is a relatively recent development in the
United States, largely because corporations were traditionally viewed as
entities lacking the ability to enetertain a requisite criminal intent. 5
Liability has now been extended to corporations in the civil context under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. In such a situation, the corporation
is liable for the actions of its employees or agents when their conduct is
carried out within the scope of employment, or with proper authority and
14 See 60 Fed. Reg. 63, 135 (Dec. 8, 1995).
'- 'led S. Rakoff etal., CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: COMPLLANCE AND
MATERIALLMGATION § 1.0211] at 1-5 (1995); Leonard Orland, Reflcctions an Carporate Crime:
Law in Search of Theory andScholarship, 17 AM,. CRIIL. REV. 501,502 (19S0),
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for the intended benefit of the corporation.' 6
The United States Supreme Court extended the doctrine of
respondeat superior to the criminal context in New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad v. United States. 7 As a result, a corporation today
may be held criminally liable for the actions of its employees or agents even
if the activity undertaken is in complete violation of company policy. 8 The
resulting general rule is that a corporation is criminally liable for the
criminal actions of its employees or agents if either acted within the scope
of their authority with the intent to benefit the corporation. 9
Even if one employee lacks the requisite criminal intent for a specific
charge, collective knowledge of several employees may be bundled and
imputed to the corporation. Courts analyzing the issue have indicated that
the aggregate of several employees' knowledge constitutes knowledge of
the corporation as a whole.2"
16 Id. (citing Prosser and Keeton, TORTS § 70 (5th ed. 1984)). See Developments in the Law --
Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1227, 1247 (1979).
17 New York Cen. & Hudson River PR. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding a
corporation liable for antitrust violations based on employee activities that were in direct conflict with
company policy), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); United States v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 467 F.2d
1000 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding the corporation criminally liable for the actions of a low-level employee
despite the fact that the employee's conduct was generally and specifically prohibited by the United
corporation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
" Charles J. Walsh and Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal
Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 607 (Winter 1995) (citing
Samuel R. MlIler, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Principle Extended to Its Limits, 38 FED. B.J. 49,
42 (1979); Samuel R. Miller & Lawrence C. Levine, Recent Developments in Corporate Criminal
Liability, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 42 (1984); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl. A. Groskaufmanis,
Minimizing Corporate Civil and CriminalLiability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct,
78 GEO. L.J. 1559,1571 (1990); Michael E. Tigar, ItDoes the Crime But Not th? Time: Corporate
CriminalLiability in FederalLaw, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 211,214-220 (1990); Steven Walt & William
Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn't Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 263, 266 (1991); Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV.1227, 1247 (1979).
20 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting United
States v. T.I.M.E. - D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 738 (1974)cert. denied, 484 U.S. 9,13 (1987) (holding
that a corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several
employees was not acquired by any one individual who then would have compreherded its full import.
Rather, the corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees and
is held responsible for their failure to act accordingly)).
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An effective corporate compliance program helps detect criminal
violations before they occur and serves as a mitigating factor for
sentencing. Some legal scholars and practitioners argue that an effective
corporate compliance program should also serve as an actual defense to
corporate criminal liability.21 However, as the law currently stands, a
corporation remains generally criminally liable for the actions of its
employees.
Enforcement of Medicare Prohibitions and
Related Statutes
The statutory Medicare prohibitions focus on false claim submission and
the manner in which referrals are generated prior to claim submission.'
Actions may arise in either a criminal or a civil context. Penalties for
violations of the statute may trigger several distinct remedies in varying
degrees depending on the nature and scope of the violation. Generally,
penalties may include mandatory program exclusion,' permissive program
exclusion,2' fines' and imprisonment' In the civil context, fines are
typically assessed at $2,000 per claim submitted, in addition to an
assessment that is not more than twice the amount claimed. 7 Criminal
convictions may be punishable by up to five years imprisonment and fines
of up to $25,000.28
In addition to false claims and referral generation prohibitions, other
health care related offenses may trigger the penalties listed above. Specific
violations may include false statements or representations with respect to
the condition or operation of an institution, illegal patient admittance and
21 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 18, at 607.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7, e seq. (1995).
'3 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1995).
24 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1995).
25 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a), et. seq. (1995).
26 Id.
27 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1995).
a 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(1995).
a 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(c)(1995).
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retention practices,3" and violations of assignment terms.31
The Medicare prohibitions proscribe several modes of conduct and
provide a number of avenues for corporate prosecution. However, health
care providers should be aware that there are other general federal statutes
capable of providing a basis for prosecution 2  Whil e federal
prosecutor is heavily armed with an arsenal of statutory weapons, the
deadliest and most efficient health care fraud fighter that has evolved is the
Civil False Claims Act.33
Enforcement Under The Civil False Claims Act
Originally aimed at Civil War defense contractors, the Civil False Claims
Act was enacted in 1863 to cleanse the defense industry of fraudulent
practices. 4 The general purpose of the Act, then and today, is to
"discourage fraud against the Government[.]"35 In recent years, the False
Claims Act has been extended beyond the realm of defense contracts to
other areas including the health care industry.3 6
Health care institutions came within the coverage of the False Claims
30 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(dX1995).
31 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(eX1995).
32 Nancy Luque, Sentencing Guidelines, HEALTH CARE FRAUD 1994 § G (American Bar
Association 1994) (Conspiracy to Defraud the Government with Respect to Claim, 18 U.S.C. § 286;
Fictitious or Fraudulent Claims, 18 U.S.C. § 287; Conspiracy to Commit Offense or Defraud United
States, 18 U.S.C. § 371; False Statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001; Mail Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; Wire
Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Obstruction of Justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1501; Money Laundering, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956-1957; Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962; Forged or
Counterfeited Contracts or Documents, 18 U.S.C. § 494-495; and the Program Fraud Civil Remedies
Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq.
33 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1995).
" Howard M. Pearl, et al., The False Claims Act and the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Kickback
Statute: An Imperfect Match, HEALTH CARE FRAUD 1995 § B-29 (American Bar Association)
(citing Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958); John R. Philips, Qui Tam Litigation,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 267,268 n.2 (June 1993); Act of March 2, 1861, 37th Cong., Sess. MI", ch. 67,
at 696-699).
" Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948,951 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S.Ct. 1110 (1995).
16 Mathew P. Harrington, Health Care Crimes: Avoiding Overenforcement, 26 RUTGERS L. J.
111, 122 n. 74 (citing United States v. Kensington Hospital, 760 F. Supp. 1120 (ED. Pa. 1991).
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Act in the wake of allegations that providers "knowingly" submitted "false
or fraudulent claim[s] for payment" to the government or that one
"knowingly" manufactured a "false record" for the purpose of submitting
a claim. 37
In 1986, Congress effectively expanded the application of the False
Claims Act by increasing the potential civil penalties and by clarifying the
definition of "knowingly. '38  Specifically, the statute defines "knowingly"
as having actual knowledge of the information, or as acting in deliberate
ignorance or reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the
information.3' Furthermore, in making its case, the Government need not
prove or offer evidence of specific intent to defraud.4"
In the absence of a specific intent requirement, the plaintiff need only
show that a defendant acted with "deliberate ignorance" or in "reckless
disregard" of the truth."1 It, therefore, follows that negligence and
innocent mistake constitute defenses under the False Claims Act." As a
result of the 1986 amendments, the intent standard was lowered to
preclude "ostrich" like behavior where an individual fails to make any
inquiry that would reveal the false claim.43
Damages sought under the False Claims Act are indeed serious,
including treble damages, mandatory fines of $5,000 to $10,000 per claim,
and the costs sustained by the Government in bringing the action."
Despite the potential to obtain prohibitively high levels of recovery, the
Government need not prove actual damages as a prerequisite to securing
17 31 U.S.C. § 3279 (a)(1)-(2) (1995).
3' BNALiberalization ofFalse ClaimsActStandard, Burdcn ofProofBcingSought, 5 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 270 (Feb. 22, 1996) (stating that a defense contracting group is currently cking
a revision of the False Claims Act that would require the plaintiffto prove "actual knowlcdgc" of the
falsity of the information).
" 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (b)(1)-(3)1995); United States v. Oakwood Dovwnriver Medical Ctr, 6S7 F.
Supp. 302,305-306 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
4' 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1995).
" United StateserreL Hagood v. Sonoma County WaterAgency, 929 F.2d 1416,1421 (9th Cir.
1991).
42 i.
' United States v. Entin, 750 F. Supp. 512,518 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citingFalse ClaimsRcfonnAct
of1985, S. Rep. No. 345,99th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong & Admin. Newa
5266).
" 31 U.S.C. § 3279(aX1995).
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the per claim recovery.45 Under a limited set of circumstances, the court
may reduce the penalties to double the damages sustained by the
Government.46 The court may exercise this limited discretion when full
disclosure of all known information is made within thirty days after the
defendant obtains the information; full cooperation is rendered to the
Government's investigation; and at the time the defendant furnished the
information, no action had commenced under the False Claims Act and the
defendant had no actual knowledge of the existence of a Government
investigation of such violation.47
Government Application of The False Claims Act
As described above, application of the False Claims Act to the health care
industry can be devastating in terms of penalties and fines. The Justice
Department collected $411 million from health care related civil litigation
in 1994, as compared to $180 million in recovery in 1993.48 One case that
is often discussed as a classic False Claims action is United States v.
Lorenzo.49 In this case, the Government levied several False Claims
allegations against Dr. Lorenzo, a dentist licensed to practice in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey.5" The allegations centered on the billing
practices of Dr. Lorenzo's company, U.S. Mobile Dental Care Systems,
Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation formed for the purpose of supplying
dental services to nursing home residents.5
Among the services supplied by Dr. Lorenzo and U.S. Mobile were
routine dental exams, which originally included an oral cavity screening for
head and neck cancer.5 2 In 1986, U.S. Mobile began to bill Medicare for
4 West, supra note 5, at 16 (citing Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United
States exrel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp.
1120 (E.D. Pa. 1991); See also United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929
F.2d 1416, 1421 (stating that "no damages need be shovn in order to recover the penalty.").
46 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1995).
47 Id.
' Michael M. Mustokoff, Erroneous Hospital Bills Not Always False Claims; Expect Even More
Prosecutions From Justice Department in 1996, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,Oct. 18, 1995, at 9.
41 United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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the cancer screening as a "limited consultation," separate and distinct from
the routine dental exam.53 The Government contended that dentists may
not bill Medicare for oral cancer examinations, unless the patient's treating
physician makes a referral for that specific purpose.' Dental services are
not compensable under Medicare generally unless they are provided in the
course of inpatient hospital treatment under Part A of Medicare.5
The court in Lorenzo determined that the defendant physician had
"knowingly" filed 3,683 "false claims" with the Government amounting to
$130,719.10 in actual damages.56 As provided in the False Claims Act, the
court assessed damages at three times the Government's actual loss and
ordered that the statutory minimum penalty of $5,000 per false claim filed
be assessed. The court ultimately held Dr. Lorenzo responsible for
$18,807,157.30 in fines and penalties; 7 however, it would have been well
within the court's discretion to impose fines and penalties against Dr.
Lorenzo in excess of $37 million, even though the actual damages to the
Government amounted to $130,000. 5'
The case of United States v. Krizekl 9 also demonstrates the seemingly
disproportionate calculation of penalties relative to the actual damages
suffered by the Government.6" In Krizek, the Government brought an
action under the False Claims Act6 alleging the defendants had falsely
billed for Medicare and Medicaid patients.6 2 The general nature of the
Government's allegation was that the defendant physician had "up-coded"
patient billings by submitting bills for a higher level of reimbursement than
was warranted for the actual level of care rendered.63 The Government
also alleged, although it was unable to prove, that Dr. Krizek had
53 Id.
' United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (ED. Pa. 1991).
55 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395(c) eL seq. (1995).
" Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. At 1133.
57 Id.
5' See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1995) stating that the court could have impo-zd the S37 Million
penalty if it had assessed a penalty of S10,000 per false claim.
51 United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5 (D.C. 1994).
' West, supra note 5, at 17.
61 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994).
' Krizek, 859 F. Supp. at 7.
6Id
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submitted bills for services that were not medically necessary.64
With respect to the "up-coding" allegations, the Government
contended that Dr. Krizek inappropriately used a billing code for 45-50
minute psychotherapy sessions (CPT Code 90844).65 Specifically, the
Government argued that 24 percent of bills submitted by Dr. Krizek,
included the CPT code for a forty-five to fifty minute session when he
should have billed for a twenty to thirty minute session. With respect to
at least 33 percent of Dr. Krizek's bill submissions, the Government
alleged that Dr. Krizek used the forty to fifty minute session CPT code
when he should have billed for a "minimal psychotherapy" session.66
Pursuant to its allegations, the Government asked the court to make
a finding that Dr. Krizek had submitted 8,002 false claims and assess fines
in excess of $80,750,000.,7 The court declined to make such a finding, but
did recognize that Dr. Krizek had submitted bills on several days where
total billings for a single day exceeded twenty hours.6 "While Dr. Krizek
may have been a tireless worker, it [was] difficult for the court to
comprehend how he could have spent more than even ten hours in a single
day serving patients. '69 Accordingly, the court held the defendant liable
under the False Claims Act on days where Dr. Krizek's claims in a single
day exceeded the equivalent of nine hours of patient care.70
The two cases described above focus on the billing practices of
individual physicians. As indicated previously, an institution may be liable
for the illegal or fraudulent conduct of its employees. Indeed, the largest
amount ever recovered in a health care fraud case settlement involved
National Medical Enterprises, Inc. (NME) with a $379 million price tag.7
In terms of its civil settlement with the United States Governemnt, NME
agreed to pay $324.2 million in damages for losses it caused to Medicare,
Medicaid, the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program, and the Civilian
" United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5,7-8 (D.C. 1994).
65 Id.
6Id.
617 Id. at ll.
6 Id. at 12.
" United States v Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 12 (D.C. 1994).
70 Id.
71 BNA, NME to Pay $379 Million in Penalties Under Settlement with Federal Agencies, 3 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 917 (July 7, 1994).
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Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services.' NME also
agreed to pay $16.3 million to various states for Medicaid fraud, $2.5 to
$5 million to the Public Health Service's Agency for health care policy and
research, $2 million to support a children's mental health program, and
$2.5 million to the National Institute of Mental Health.' The criminal
penalties included fines totaling $36 million and a seven and one-half year
prison sentence for the institution's chief executive officer.74 In addition,
NME agreed to implement a corporate compliancefintegrity program."
With Medicare prohibition rules, the False Claims Act, and other
statutes available, the federal prosecutor in false claims cases is armed with
what appears to be an arsenal of fraud deterrents. This regulatory gauntlet
within which health care providers "operate" is a source of frustration and
concern for health care providers and their advocates. One commentator
has suggested that "making every false statement a crime ... is like making
every attempt at shoplifting cognizable in the federal courts.""6
While the Government is heavily armed, there is case law that
suggests that in some instances prosecutors may only choose one weapon
in which to bring to the "fight.""7 If a prosecutor must choose a particular
cause of action under which to pursue fraudulent conduct, the choice is
unequivocally going to be the False Claims Act.
Double Jeopardy and Choosing a Cause of Action
In United States v. Halper," the respondent was convicted in an
independent proceeding under the federal criminal false-claims statute" for
72id
74 Id.
' Ia (stating that the corporate integrity program included an annual report to the Department of
Health and Human Services, an educational program that was to be implemented vithin 90 dak:, of
the settlement agreement, voluntary disclosure upon the discovery of any malfeazance, ot-.n ace=z
to NMB's books, and payment for any investigations in the future).
7 Harrington, supra note 35, at 152.
See United States v. Halper,490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that imposing exceptional fine: under
the False Claims Act upon a defendant already convicted of the sarne offensc eon.titute: a zz.ond
.punishment" for purposes of Constitutional Double Jeopardy analysis).
7 Id.
7- Id. at 438.
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submitting sixty-five false claims for Medicare reimbursement. Halper was
fined in the amount of $5,000 and sentenced to prison for a five-year
term.8" Having only suffered actual damages in the amount of $585, the
Government was compelled to subsequently bring the cause of action
against the respondent under the Civil False Claims Act.8" Based on
findings of fact from the criminal proceeding, the Government's motion for
summary judgment was granted in the civil proceeding.8" Therefore,
Halper should have been ordered to pay the statutory penalty of
$130,000.83
Although it was a civil penalty, the lower court viewed the penalty as
entirely unreasonable relative to the actual damages of $585.84 The court
found the excessive fine to be punitive thus constituting a "second
punishment" under double jeopardy analysis.8" Adding the Government's
cost of litigation to the $585 actual damages figure, the court imposed a
fine of $16,000 on the respondent.86 The key ruling was that multiple
punishments for the same conduct are constitutionally prohibited under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.87
The critical inquiry in determining the issue of multiple punishments
is whether the civil sanction imposed in a particular case contemplates a
goal of punishment.88 The Supreme Court's specific holding in Halper was
that under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a defendant who has already been
punished criminally may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction that
may be characterized as a deterrent or as retribution.89
In the wake of Halper, the issue of whether a defendant may be
prosecuted criminally subsequent to a large civil penalty remains
unresolved. However, the undecided nature of the issue is influential to
prosecutors choosing a cause of action. Furthermore, a defendant may be
10 Id. at 437.
Il d. at 438.
United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 532-533 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
8 The pre-1986 version of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 called for a $2,000 penalty for each false claim.United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,438-439 (1989).
85 See, Id.
" Id. (citing United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. at 534).
87Id.
s Id. at 448.
s United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-449 (1989).
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able to make an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause argument even
if there has been no prior criminal prosecution,"
In addition to the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines arguments,
there are several reasons why a prosecutor might choose to pursue a health
care fraud claim under the Civil False Claims Act as opposed to the
Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute or other criminal statutes that
may be available.
A prosecutor deliberating over which cause of action to bring
necessarily contemplates the level of proof that is required to prevail in the
cause of action and the availability of evidence that is required to satisfy
that standard. A comparison of the "intent" standard under the Medicare
and Medicaid anti-kickback statute and "not knowingly" standard under
the False Claims Act is instructive.
As mentioned above, under the False Claims Act, satisfying the
"knowingly" standard does not require a showing of specific intent."
However, under the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute
provision, the intent standard is generally much harder to meet The
Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute generally prohibit any person
from "knowingly" and "willfully" soliciting or receiving any direct or
indirect remuneration in return for referring an individual for an item or
service for which payment will be sought under Medicare or Medicaid. 2
The statute also prohibits any person from offering or paying any direct or
indirect remuneration to induce the referral of an individual for an item or
" See Bennis v. Michigan, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1565 at *17; Dep't of Revenue of Montana v.
Durth Ranch eL aL, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994) ("A civil forfeiture may violate the Eighth
Amendments proscription against excessive fines"); Browning-Ferris Indus, v Kelco Di"ozal, 492
U.S. 257, 275 n. 21 (1989) (noting that damages awarded to the Government may raie concerns
under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Austin v, United State:, 509 U S 602,
113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) ("The Eighth Amendmenfs text is not expressly limited to crinal eases, and
its history does not require such a limitation"); Peterson v. Weinbcrger, SOS F2d 45, 55 (Sth Cir
1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975) (Upholding the District Courfs finding that a S2,000 fine
per 120 false claims would be disproportionate and unreasonable as compared to the Govemiment's
actual loss).
" 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1995)(stating that a showving ofdelilerate ignorance or rec-kle-: di regard
may satisfy the "mowingly" standard under the Act).
92 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(1995).
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service for which payment will be sought under Medicare or Medicaid. 3
The OIG and courts interpreting the "intent" requirement of the
statute ("knowingly" and "willfully") have historically applied a broad
standard. In one case, United States v. Greber,94 the court held that the
statute is violated if any portion of any payment is intended to induce a
physician to refer a patient, even if the payment is also intended to
compensate for legitimate professional service fees." In this case, Dr.
Greber paid physicians an interpretation or consultation fee when the
physicians referred patients to his diagnostic services company. 6
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a narrow
interpretation of the statute's "intent" requirement in Hanlester Network v.
Shalala.97 Hanlester Network involved an arrangement between the
network, its physician investors, and Smithkline BioScience Laboratories
(SKBL).98 Specifically, the court focused on the manner in which the
Hanlester Network offered limited partnership shares to physician-
investors and the ensuing flow of Government reimbursement funds
between SKBL and the Hanlester Network. 99
In Hanlester Network, the court construed "knowingly and willfully"
to mean that the Government must prove that an individual entered into an
arrangement "knowing" that the agreement violated the anti-kickback
statute and that the individual had the specific intent to violate the law.100
Without explicit communication between the parties that specifies an
intent to defraud the government, the prosecution will have a difficult time
proving violations of the Anti-kickback statute.
' The reader should note that several safe harbors exist that shelter certain business arrangements
from prosecution under the anti-kickback statute. Conversely, the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
has issued "Special Fraud Alerts" that describe various conduct that is viewed as "questionable" under
the statute. If an arrangement fits squarely within a safe harbor, it may nevertheless represent legal
activity if it is not intended to induce referrals. Id.
'9 United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cerl. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
9S Id.
96 Id.
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Although virtually impossible to satisfi an intent requirement that
sanctions ignorance of the law as a defense, the scienter requirement might
be proved through deposition testimony of employees or through
introduction of other "smoking gun" documents. Such documents might
contain language specifying "in exchange for referrals" or "compensation
per referral" or "as a percentage of referrals," etc.
In arriving at its decision, the court in Hanlester Network relied on
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of"willfulness" in Ratzlaf
v. United States.' Ratzlaf involved an appeal from a conviction for
"willfuly" entering into a financial transaction for the purpose of avoiding
the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act."" The Supreme
Court concluded that "willfulness" means the individual knew the
arrangement violated the law."3
The OIG viewed the Hanlester Network case as "wrongfully decided"
and interprets it as extending only to the Ninth Circuit. The OIG's position
is that the Greber "intent" standard remains good law elsewhere. On
November 15th, 1995, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the
Government's petition to rehear en banc the Hanlester Network case and
the U.S. solicitor general declined to petition the Supreme Court for
review of the rehearing denial.04
Ultimately, the OIG position that the Hanlester Network decision only
applies to the Ninth Circuit may be somewhat misplaced. On October 3,
1995, a U.S. District Court in Minnesota acquitted an employee of
Genentech Inc. of charges under the Anti-kickback statute,' This
litigation involved the marketing and sales methods surrounding a growth
hormone called Protopin."'0 In arriving at his decision, the judge applied
the "specific intent" standard of the Hanlester Network case." 7 However,
'() Ratzlaffv. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 657 (1994).
102 Id.
103 Id.
C' BNA,DOJRefuses toA4 .forSupreme Court llicw of Hanlester.Inti-Kicl'bac Cas2, 5 B% A
HEALTH L. REP. 200 (Feb. 8, 1996).
lOS United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
ICS Id.
"o' Id. More recently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a "heightened intent" 1andard
ahen it upheld a conviction under the Anti-ickback statute. Sce United State- v. Jain, 93 F 3d 436
(8th Cir. 1996), reh 'g denied, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27478 (Sth Cir., Oct 22, 1996)
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on November 27, 1995, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio expressly rejected the Hanlester Network scienter standard in
United States v. Neufeld. "8
In addition to the eased "intent" requirement, potential damages under
the False Claims Act appreciably exceed those that are obtainable through
other potential remedial measures. At $5,000 to $10,000 per false claim,
in addition to treble damages, the total fines and penalties accumulate
quickly to reach astronomical levels. Faced with the threat of fines and
penalties well into the millions of dollars, "[h]ospitals will settle for
nominal amounts even if they feel it's like extortion.""1 9 Furthermore, the
standard of proof required in a civil action is "by a preponderance" of the
evidence. By selecting to pursue allegedly fraudulent activity under the
False Claims Act, the prosecutor evades the daunting task of proving a
case "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Considering the burdens on the prosecution, pursuing a cause of
action under the False Claims Act, as opposed to seeking a remedy under
the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-kickback statute, appears to be a rational
decision. Choosing to pursue a False Claims Act action is consistent with
a prosecutor increasing the chances of victory and positively effecting the
efficient allocation of Government resources.
To this point, the focus of the False Claims Act discussion has been
on actions brought by the government. However, as the next section of
this article describes, private litigants may also institute civil actions for
false claims under the provisions of the Act."' In considering the liability
exposure of any health care institution, the false claims civil action brought
by the private individual perhaps poses the greatest threat. An employee's
access to practices and records allows for a thorough "investigation" of
day to day activities.
Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act
'0 United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
109 BNA, Billing Fraud, Reimbursement Among Top Medicare Legal Issues in 1996, 5 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 165 (Feb. 1, 1996).
10 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1995).
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Individuals may bring causes of action under the False Claims Act's "qui
tam" provision. Short for qui tam pro domino rege quam prose ipso in
hacparte sequitur, which means "he who brings the action for the king as
well as for himself""' Referred to as "relators," the qui tam plaintiff
stands to earn substantial compensation if a judgment or settlement results
from the information provided.' Instilling fear in corporate counsel and
management everywhere, courts and commentators frequently refer to qui
tam plaintiffs as "private attorney generals." '
The concept of earning large monetary rewards for providing
information is generally consistent with the statute's purpose of detecting
and preventing federal law violations." 4 Furthermore, statutory protection
is afforded to qui tam plaintiffs who are discharged, demoted, suspended,
threatened, harassed, or discriminated against as a result of lawfully
reporting information about an employer to the Government."' Relief in
this context might include reinstatement and full restoration of seniority,
damages, attorney fees, court costs, and double the amount of back pay
with interest." 6
The qui tam plaintiffs complaint must be filed in camera, and must
remain under seal for at least sixty days." 7 The complaint is not served on
the defendant until the court orders service, and the Government may
intervene and proceed with the action within sixty days after it receives
both the complaint and the material evidence and information," Whether
. David J. Ryan, TheFalse ClaimnsAct An Old Weapon with ,ew Fireposer isAimed at Health
Care Fraud, 4 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 127, n.2 (1995) (quoting William Bla.cktono, Commentane-
on the Law of England, Book 19, 160 (1768)).
112 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1995).
" See United States ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F3d 995,997 n2 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(citing United States ex reL LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F2d 17, 19 n2 (lst Cir. 1990)), See also
West, supra note 5, at 26 (citing JA Mmkoff, et. al., Sounding Board. Be andAdvance Dircotives -
Health CareSurrogate Law, 327 NEW ENG J. MED. 1165-1169 (1992)),
1.4 United States exrel. Barbara Burch v. Piqua Engineering, S03 F. Supp. 115, I11 (SD Ohio
1992) (citing Evan Caminker, The Constitutionalil, of Qui Tan Actions, 99 YALE L. J. 341,344
(1989)).
"' 31 U.S.C. § 37300)(1995).
116 Id.
17 31 U.S.C. § 3730(bX2XI995).
118 Id.
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or not the Government elects to proceed with the action will affect the
amount of recovery obtainable by the qui tam plaintiff. If the Government
proceeds with an action, the qui tam plaintiff receives between 15 and 25
percent of the Government's recovery, depending on the extent to which
the qui tam plaintiffs information substantially contributed to the
prosecution of the action." 9 The qui tam plaintiff is also entitled to
recovery of reasonable attorney fees and costs. 20
If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the qui tam
plaintiff may receive an amount between 25 and 30 percent of the total
recovery, in addition to recovery of attorney fees and costs. 121 If the qui
tam plaintiff planned or initiated the activity which gave rise to the
complaint and ensuing litigation, the court has discretion to appropriately
adjust the level of recovery.12 Furthermore, if the qui tam plaintiff is
criminally convicted for activity that gave rise to the False Claims Act
violation, the qui tam plaintiff must be dismissed from the civil action as a
plaintiff and may not receive any share of the recovery."z Similarly, in
order to receive a monetary award, a qui tam plaintiff must be an "original
source" to the Government, and have direct and independent knowledge
of the information on which the allegations are based.1 24
The financial incentives and procedural protections created by the
False Claims Act's qui tam provision for private litigants have proven to be
effective. In 1987, only $200,000 was recovered as a consequence of qui
tam actions.125 In 1994, $378 million was obtained through qui tam
actions out of a total of $1.09 billion recovery from all civil fraud cases.126
The private plaintiffs in these 1994 cases received a total of $70 million for
their efforts."2 As individual recoveries become publicized, the frequency
19 31 U.S.C. § 3730(dXIX1995).
120 Id.
121 31 U.S.C. § 3730(dX2XI995).
122 31 U.S.C. § 3730(dX3XI995).
12 Id.
124 31 U.S.C. § 3730(eX4)(B(1995).
121 West, supra note 5, at 16 (citing BNA, Government Recovers $800 Million Through
WhistleblowerLitigation, BNA MEDICARE REPORT, Vol.5, No. 45, pp. 1291-1292, Nov. 18, 1994).
1 Ryan,supra note 110, at 129-130 (citing Josh Chetvynd, Recoveries by U.8from Civil Fraud
Surged in Fiscal '94, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 12, 1994, at B3).
127 David D. Queen and Elizabeth E. Frasher, DESIGNING A HEALTH CARE CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 25 (1995).
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of qui tam suits under the False Claims Act will undoubtedly increase.
Therefore,to prevent the need for private plaintiffs to bring an action under
the qui tam section of the Act, organizations must attempt to comply with
the law and implement appropriate measures.
Defendants facing qui tam lawsuits usually argue that the suits against
them are unconstitutional because such actions violate the Article III
standing requirement, the doctrine of separation of powers, and the
Appointment Clause constraints on who may litigate on behalf of the
United States. However, parties invoking such constitutional arguments
have experienced little, if any, success.12 1
Qui Tam Cases and Potential Expansion of the False Claims Act
The financial incentives and procedural protections afforded qui tam
plaintiffs undeniably serve to increase the number of qi tam suits brought
under the False Claims Act and, therefore, the amount of recovery to the
Government. However, the scope and reach of the False Claims Act and
its qui tam provision is an issue currently undergoing judicial review. Qui
tam plaintiffs are motivated to bring actions within the reach of the False
Claims Act in an effort to gain access to qui tam provisions and the
potential for lottery-size winnings. The direction the courts take with
respect to the scope of the False Claims Act will dictate the extent to
which institutional health care providers must examine internal practices
and implement compliance efforts.
The case of United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Health Corp. and
Diabetes Treatment Centers of America"I is illustrative of the potential
expansion of the False Claims Act. Although the plaintiff in Pogue signed
a release and discharge of all claims and a covenant not to sue, the plaintiff
later filed an action under the qui tam provision of the False Claims Act
against his former employer, Diabetes Treatment Centers of
America("DTCA"), American Healthcorp, Inc.("AHC"), DTCA's parent
company, and West Paces Medical Center ('West Paces"). In addition, the
2 United States exreL Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft, 63 F.3d 1512,1520(9th Cir. 1995) (This
circuit has addressed and rejected (each of] these exact [constitutionall arguments).
" United States exrel Pogue v. American Health Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXMS 16710 (liddle
District of Tennessee, Sept. 14, 1995) (Opinion altered Jan. 5, 1996).
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plaintiff in Pogue specifically named five physicians along with various
John Doe defendant hospitals and physicians. 3 '
Pogue alleged the defendants submitted fraudulent claims to Medicare
for reimbursement in violation of the False Claims Act. He specifically
alleged that the defendants were involved in a scheme whereby physicians
would refer Medicare and Medicaid patients to West Paces in violation of
the Anti-kickback"' and Self-referral'32 statutes.
The plaintiffs argued that the claims were false and fraudulent
maintaining that the Government would have excluded the defendants from
the Medicare and Medicaid programs had it been aware of the Anti-
kickback and Self-referral violations.' Therefore, the defendants
maintained that the claims submitted were not in violation of any Federal
law that would prevent the defendant from participating in the Medicare
or Medicaid programs.'34
The defendants, both the institutions and individuals, filed a motion
for summary judgment and alternatively, a motion to dismiss under
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.'35 The court first considered the summary judgment motion that
was entirely based on the release between the plaintiff and his former
employer.'36 The court denied the summary judgment motion, because the
release violated public policy.'37 However, the court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiff fiiled to allege
the claims were actually false or fraudulent, or that the U.S. suffered
130 Id. at *2.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1995).
132 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1995) (noting that the prohibition against self-referrals is also referred to as
the "Stark" law or amendment).
133 United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Health Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16716, at *3




137 Id. at 16-17 (ruling that a violation of the anti-kickback or self-referral statutes would not
automatically constitute a violation of the False Claims Act).
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damages as a result of the alleged "false claims."13
At the same time, the plaintiff in Pogue also filed a motion to
reconsider the motion to dismiss.' Surprisingly, on January 5, 1996, the
trial judge overruled his own dismissal order from September 14, 1995.140
The court first reconsidered the proposition that a plaintiff needs to prove
that the Government has suffered harm in order to bring a False Claims Act
claim. 14 In the motion to reconsider, the court simply recognized a U.S.
Supreme Court case precedent holding that no showing of actual damages
is necessary as a prerequisite to obtaining recovery under the False Claims
Act. 142
The court further reconsidered whether submitting claims that violate
the Anti-kickback or Self-referral statutes constituted a violation of the
False Claims Act. In overruling the dismissal order, the court looked for
guidance from other jurisdictions and concluded that the False Claims Act
was intended to govern fraudulent acts that result in the government
making payments to unintended parties."
In reaching its decision, the court in Pogue specifically relied on the
decision in United States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony.'45 In this case, the
plaintiff claimed that the defendants were engaged in practices that violated
the "Fraud and Abuse Statute" and, therefore, the submission of claims
associated with those practices amounted to submitting false or fraudulent
' United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Health Corp,, 1995 U,S. Dist LEXIS 16710, *7-9
(Middle District of Tennessee, Sept 14, 1995) (Opinion altered Jan. 5, 1996) (citing United States
exreL Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1995); See also Tovn of Ncvton v. Rumerny
480 U.S. 386 (1987) ("[A] promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed
in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement")
139 IJ
140 Id. at *16-17 (ruling that a violation of the Anti-kickback or Self-referral vtatutes %ould not
automatically constitute a violation of the False Claims Act).
141 BNA, CourtAlters on heher Injury Needed for a Violation of ze False Claims Acl, 5 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 10 (Jan. 18, 1996).
"' See Id; See also Rex Trailer v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States x rt
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 527 (1943); United States v. Kensington Hoap,, 760 F. Supp 1120 (ED.
Pa. 1991); United States exrel Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416,1421 (9th
Cir.)("No damages need be showm in order to recover the penalty").
143 Id.
4 BNA, supra note 140.
145 United States ex rel Roy v. Anthony, 914 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
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claims. 1" The court noted that this "vague assertion" created a "tenuous
connection" between the False Claims Act and the "Fraud nd Abuse
Statute."147 Tenuous or not, the court deemed the connection to be
sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.1 48
While both Pogue and Roy underwent judicial review at the federal
appellate level, 149 the possibility remains that the False Claims Act will
expand to cover other "fraudulent conduct." This expansion would simply
facilitate and expand the ease with which qui tam plaintiffs may bring
actions under the False Claims Act. An institution embarking on a
compliance project should contemplate all areas in which a qui tam action
could materialize. A successful compliance program will significantly
reduce, if not eliminate, the ability of employees to bring actions under the
qui tam provision of the False Claims Act.
CURRENT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
With specific laws identified under which to shape an effective compliance
program, the scope of potential liability exposure under these laws must be
measured. Corporate vulnerabilities can only be quantified after an
assessment of current Government enforcement efforts. The unfortunate
experiences of other institutions exposed to Government investigation and
prosecution may provide a map with which to build a corporate
compliance program.
Developing and implementing a corporate compliance program is
usually a condition of settlement agreements entered into between the DOJ
and the settling institution. The terms of such compliance agreements have
been characterized as "draconian" compared to components of a "self-
141 Id. at 1507.
147 Id.
148 Id. ("Under the facts alleged, the Plaintiff could produce evidence that would show that the
kickbacks allegedly paid to the defendant physicians somehow tainted the cldlms for Medicare,
Additionally, the Plaintiff may establish that his claims for Medicare payments were constructively
false or fraudulent. It does not appear beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief').
149 BNA, Appeals Court Asked to Review Case Involving Anti-kickbackAllegations, 5 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 507 (April 4, 1996).
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imposed" compliance strategy.'
The primary focus of the collaborative efforts between the OIG and
the DOJ is on practices that the Government perceives as fraudulent.
Recent specific enforcement efforts include the "physical presence
requirement" for teaching physicians to submit Part B claims to
Medicare,' the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) seventy-two hour
window project,' billing Medicare for procedures that utilize
investigational devices not fully approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA),' billing for unnecessary services)' and general
"upcoding."'55 The first three enforcement efforts are discussed below as
the OIG and the DOJ have recently engaged in national uniform programs
aimed at these particular practices. General "upcoding" and unnecessary
billing will most certainly be examined in most every investigative instance
regardless of the investigations main focus.
Intermediary Letter 372 and the "Physical Presence" Requirement
The Clinical Practices of the University of Pennsylvania ('CPUP")
settlement referred to at the outset of this article was based in part on
allegations that during the period from 1989 to 1994, faculty physicians
were billing Medicare for services that were actually performed by
residents in training. The Government's general position is that it already
subsidizes the residents' training and salaries through Graduate Medical
150 See Queen and Frasher, supra note 126, at 20.
1' Health Care Fmancing Administration (HCFA) Payment Policies for Services of Te-ching
Physicians, 60 Fed. Reg. 63139 (Dec. 8,1995Xto be codified at 42 C.FR. 400).
' BNAPenrsylvania Hospital Settlements Show Willingness to Ensure ProperBilhng, 5 BMA
HEALTHL. REP. 331 (March 7,1996) (stating that the DRG 72-Hour Window Project involve, fat:::
claims allegations of illegal Medicare billing for non-physician outpatient service- provided in
conjunction with inpatient admissions).
L" BNASutter Aemorial to Pay S1.3 Aillion to Settle MedicalDevice Fraud Charges, 4 BN.A
HEALTH CAREPOLY REP. 9 (Feb. 26, 1996Xstating the involvement of allegations under the Falcke
Claims Act of fraudulent Medicare billing for investigational cardiac device implant procedures that
have not received final FDA approval).
1 BNA, supra note 70 (discussing the billing for unnecessary services settlement).
1S BAPhysician Consents to $98,000 Payment to Settle Charges of Upcoding, Fraud, 4 BNA
HEALTHL. REP. 1727 (Nov. 16,1995Xdefining upcoding as billing for more expenrive services than
those that were actually rendering).
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Education (GME) programs, and thus they should not pay for their
treating services.156 Alleged violations of the proposed regulation would
likely constitute violations of the False Claims Act from the purview of the
Government. Liability may be attached to the institution under a
respondeat superior theory as described in previous sections.
Intermediary Letter 372 ("I.L. 372"), issued in 1969, set forth the
conditions under which physicians in "teaching settings" were required to
satisfy in order to be considered "attending physicians." '157 An "attending
physician" was typically qualified to charge Medicare for services in which
a resident was involved for the attending's services.
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), via its rule that
became effective July 1, 1996, eliminated the I.L. 372 "attending
physician" criteria for purposes of determining whether payment should be
made for the services of physicians in teaching settings. 58 As a condition
to receiving payment under Medicare Part B subsequent to July 1, 1996,
a teaching physician must be physically present for a "key portion" of the
time during the rendering of the service.
In the case of complex or dangerous procedures, the teaching
physician must be present during all "critical portions" of the procedure
and must be "immediately available" to be called upon during the entire
service or procedure." 9 All documentation in the medical record should
reflect the actual physical presence of the physician. HCFA and its agents
take the position that "if it was not documented, it did not happen.6
Physical Presence: New Regulation or Clarification of Old Rule?
116 60 Fed. Reg 63135 (1995).
157 Id.
s Id. at 63139.
1" Id. at 63139-63140 (stating that in the case of surgery, documentation should reflect the exact
time in which the teaching physician was actually present and "scrubbed in," or "elbow to elbow" with
the resident. In the case of procedures such asendoscopies, the teaching physician evaluation and
management services, the teaching physician should bill at a complexity level appropriate for the
teaching physician's level of experience).
"o Stan Weintraub, Health Care Financing Administration, Address to the Association of American
Medical Colleges (Feb. 12, 1996).
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For reasons that may become more evident after reading the "Preliminary
Compliance Program Review" section below, it is important to recognize
that HCFA describes the July 1, 1996 "physical presence requirement" as
a "mere clarification," as opposed to a "new rule.161 Generally, taking
steps to ensure that an institution is conducting business in a manner that
is consistent with a prospectively enforceable law yields implications that
differ from examining current business practices in an effort to ensure that
the institution has been complying with the law.
Analyzing the history of the "new rule" that became effective July 1,
1996, reveals several arguments that the new regulation is in fact a "new
rule" as opposed to a "mere clarification."' 6 In 1967, the Bureau of
Health Insurance ("BBI) promulgated a rule that authorized fee-for-
service payment when an "attending physician" furnished "personal and
identifiable direction" to a resident participating in the care of patients. 63
The rule, supplanted by Intermediary Letter 372 in 1969, contained no
"physical presence"' requirement. 16'
Intermediary Letter 372 ("I.L. 372") included a provision that the
"attending physician" be "present and ready to perform" major surgery and
complex procedures. 6 However, I.L. 372 contained no explicit "physical
presence" requirement for procedures other than major surgery and
complex procedures. In 1970, the BHI issued a letter in the form of
questions and answers to Part B intermediaries that arguably established
the first "physical presence" rule.1" However, a "physical presence"
requirement has never been consistently enforced during the twenty-five
years I.L. 372 has been the law.
As opposed to enacting any "physical presence requirement,"
Congress has left in place a law that merely requires "sufficient personal
and identifiable physicians' services to the patient to exercise full, personal
1" Miller & Chevalier, The Physical Presence Rule, Past and Future - How HCF Plans to Get
You Coming and Going, Health Law Alert, Feb. 1996 at 2.
" Robert Saner, Powers Pyles Sutfer & Verville P.C., Address to the As-ociation of American
Medical Colleges (Feb. 12, 1996).
"' 20 CYF.R. § 405.521 (1967).
'6 See Intermediary Letter 372 (issued 1969).
16 Id
" See Intermediary Letter 70-2 (issued 1970).
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control over the management of the portion of the case" in order to seek
payment under Medicare Part B.167  A clear "physical presence"
requirement was articulated in a December 30, 1992 memorandum from
the Director of Payment Policy at HCFA, to all the agency's regional
offices.'68 While several Part B carriers implemented the memorandum
from Booth, others ignored it entirely. 69
HCFA eventually advised all its intermediaries that a formal rule
would be issued and that if a carrier was not enforcing a "physical
presence" requirement prior to December 30, 1992, it should not alter its
payment policies until the issuance of the final rule. 7 The history, viewed
in conjunction with statements in the December 8, 1995 regulation,
indicate that "physical presence" would be a formal requirement only as
of July 1, 1996.
The preamble to the new rule makes several statements that support
the argument that "physical presence" would become an official
requirement only after the new regulation became effective. Recognizing
that I.L. 372 has never been "applied uniformly by all Medicare carriers,"
the preamble states that it should be "replaced," suggesting that a "new"
rule will take its place.'71
A tacit admission is contained in the preamble that I.L. 372 required
the "attending physician's" presence during major surgery and complex
procedures "but was vague, perhaps necessarily, on the matter of the
presence of the physician during other occasions of inpatient service."' 72
While the preamble refers to the "physical presence" requirement in the
167 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(bX7XAXi)(I-m) (1995) ("In the case of physicians' services furnished to
a patient in a hospital with a teaching program, ... the carrier shall not provide ... fcr payment for such
services under this part - (i)unless - (1) the physician renders sufficient personial and identifiable
physicians services to the patient to exercise full, personal control over the management of the portion
of the case for which the payment is sought, [and] (I1) the services are of the same character as the
services the physician furnishes to patients not entitled to benefits under this subehapter").
16 Saner, supra note 161 (stating that the "Booth Memorandum" says that: "A service furnished




' 60 Fed. Reg. 63137-63138 (1995).
172 Id. at 63138.
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new regulation as a "clarification,"'" it also refers to it as a "proposed
condition."174
As compliance is examined and formally implemented, the "new rule'
theory should be considered and assessed in opposition to the
"clarification" argument. While "physical presence" is arguably a new
requirement, at least "personal and identifiable" and "full, personal control"
has always been the requirement. Therefore, the physician who is
submitting Part B bills to Medicare while vacationing, would clearly violate
both the "old" and "new" rule and would be vulnerable to a False Claims
Act cause of action.
A stickier issue may arise, for example, where the teaching physician
arrives at the hospital at 3:00 a.m. after the resident has performed at least
half of the procedure. In this instance, it is arguable that the physician
provided "personal and identifiable" services for which payment could have
been sought without being physically present for the entire "key portion"
of the service. HCFA has expressed its intention to be flexible with regard
to the definition of "key portion,175 and has also expressed its view that
"physical presence" has always been the rule. However, for the reasons
articulated in this section, it is likely that the "physical presence"
requirement is only officially and formally effective as of July 1, 1996.
The University of Pennsylvania Settlement
As previously mentioned, the elements of a Government's imposed
compliance program may contain overly burdensome, draconian
requirements. The settlement agreement between the CPUP and the
United States is illustrative of a typical compliance regimen that the
Government will impose as a component of a settlement agreement. One
of the allegations included in the settlement agreement referenced
"inadequate documentation and violations of billing requirements for
services of attending physicians who involve residents in the care of their
'7' Id. at 63140.
'74 Id. at 63129.
" Bart McCann, M.D., Health Care Financing Administration, Addric-. to the Aszcziation of
American Medical Colleges (Feb. 12, 1996).
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patients."" It should be noted that CPUP and its physicians denied any
wrongdoing in entering into the settlement agreement. Furthermore, the
agreement dismisses CPUP from the civil action with prejudice but does
not foreclose the possibility that the Government will bring a criminal
action.'
The settlement agreement generally covered four broad areas:
centralization of billing functions, implementation of internal and external
auditing, mandatory education, and implementation of information and
reporting telephone lines.17
CPUP was already moving toward centralization of its billing
functions prior to the investigation and ensuing settlement.'79 However,
all business and financial functions subsequent to the agreement will be
directed by the Chief Financial Officer of CPUP. The centralization will
make monitoring easier for CPUP and will allow the Government to
investigate with ease in the future. The hallmark of centralization at CPUP
is the utilization of inpatient chart abstractors. Under this system, chart
abstractors will bill Medicare based on documentation in the chart. Thus,
"if it is not documented in the chart, the abstractors [will not] bill it."' 80
Monitoring and auditing is separated into "internal" and "external" for
CPUP."' On the internal side, an office of billing compliance will be
established, whereby, the work of each chart abstractor will be reviewed
twice per year to ensure the bills being submitted are appropriate and
accurate." Physicians' billing practices for outpatient services will also be
audited under the system.' Those physicians who are unable to bring
their billing practices within the boundaries of the law will have to pay for
116 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, December 12, 1995, at 3.
'" Id. (Under the terms of the agreement, CPUP vaived and "Double Jeopardy" argument that
it could potentially make if a criminal action is brought subsequent to the settlement agreement. In
doing so it agreed to disregard the decision in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
178 John E. Steiner, Jr., Assistant General Counsel, American Hospital Association, Address to the
Metropolitan Chicago Healthcare Council (Mar. 18, 1996).
178 Mary Stein, Assistant General Counsel, Clinical Practices of the University of Pennsylvania,
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extended auditing, and may face suspension from billing Medicare."
External audits will be conducted by an independent auditing firm, at
CPUP's expense; the auditing firm who will conduct a review of
professional fee billings on a yearly basis for the next five years and will
report the results to the Government or the intermediary.S 5
Standards and policies for these practices will be developed and
disseminated through mandatory education.S6 Physicians or employees
not attending mandatory educational sessions will be penalized and
suspended in some instances.1 17 The educational program emphasizes the
objective of accurate and complete documentation.S In addition,
telephone lines will be installed to afford physicians and employees the
opportunity to ask billing questions, or to report any aberrant billing
practices or other malfeasance."S9 The reporting line is intended to allow
the reporting employee to remain anonymous."'
Compliance is obviously an expensive task to undertake. However,
an effective compliance program need not be as formal or expensive as a
government-imposed program. Furthermore, the time lines wiU be much
shorter with a Government-imposed program. The best approach is to
implement a compliance program before one is ordered to do so.
DRG 72-Hour Window Project
The DRG 72-Hour Window Project refers to an ongoing investigation by
the OIG whereby inpatient DRG charges are cross-referenced with non-
physician outpatient service charges. 9 A False Claims Act allegation is
generated if a separate bill was submitted for non-physician outpatient








M 42 U.S.C. § 1395wwta)(4) (1995) (The DRG reimbursement level for a particular czrvice
includes all services that are provided by the hospital (or by an entity- holly ovwned or op rated by the
hospital) to the patient during the three days immediately preceding the patienfs zdmi::ion date),
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The government will assert that prior experience with false claim
submission and repayment to the Government is enough to prove the
"knowledge" element of a False Claims charge.192
Allegations in hand, the Government will make a pre-trial offer to the
institution that provides an incentive for settling, rather than retaining
defense counsel at great expense. 3 "Hospitals will settle for nominal
amounts even if they feel it's like extortion""94 and "out of fear of what the
Government might find if they really start digging into their record[s]." '
A hospital will typically become aware that it is the target of an
investigation after it receives a settlement demand letter fi'om the DOJ.
The letter would likely be addressed to a Finance Manager or Chief
Financial Officer. Consider the following letter:
Dear Hospital Chief Financial Officer:
The United States Department of Health and Human Services
through the Office of Inspector General has referred a matter concerning
North Community Hospital to the Department of Justice for civil
prosecution pursuant to the Federal False Claims Act, The matter arises
from an audit by the Office of Inspector General through which it has
concluded that your institution separately billed Medicare for non-
physician outpatient services which were provided in conjunction with
inpatient admissions and therefore were reimbursed as part of the DRG.
Through this latest review it has been determined that North
Community Hospital requested and received Medicare payments, to which
it was not entitled, totalling $9,708.55 on 29 claims for non-physician
outpatient services between November 1, 1990 and December 31, 1991.
In addition, Medicare beneficiaries were required to pay coinsurance and
deductibles for claims which your hospital should not have processed for
payment. Between December 1, 1987 and October 31, 1990, you also
billed Medicare for such services. For that period, there were 94 duplicate
192 BNA, Pennsylvania Hosp ital Settlements Show Willingness to Ensure Proper Billing, 5 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 331 (Feb. 7, 1996).
193 Id.
"4 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990) ("The natural meaning of the vord 'extort'
is to obtain money or other valuable thing neither by compulsion, by actual force, or by the force of
motives applied to the will, and often more overpowering and irresistible than physical force").
19 BNA, Billing Fraud, Reimbursement Among Top Medicare Legal Issues in 1996, 5 DNA
HEALTH L. REP. 165 (Feb. 1, 1996) (quoting Dennis M. Barry, Vinson & Elldns, Washington,
D.C.).
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claims totalling $29,135.17.
Your hospital had filed similar duplicate claims whiph were
identified in prior reviews covering the period October 1, 1983 through
November 30, 1987, of which you should already be aware. Indeed, it is
the recuring nature of this long-standing problem which in part motivates
this enforcement effort. All of the amounts identified in the first three
reviews have been recovered by HCFA through various processcs.
However, those recoveries have not extinguished the hospital's potential
liability for penalties and treble damages under the False Claims Act as a
result of its conduct.
Based on the above, it has been determined that your institution
should be civilly prosecuted pursuant to that Act. This action will be
conducted as a collaborative effort of the offices of the U.S. Attorney for
your district Successful prosecution of such a case will result in the
recoupment of the remaining unrecovered payments, the assessment of
treble damages, and a mandatory minimum penalty of five thousand dollars
($5,000) per false claim. The maximum penalty per claim is S10,000. It
should be noted that the assessment of penalties is mandated by the False
Claims Act and the Court may not assess a penalty less than $5,000 per
claim. The total financial exposure ofyour hospital arising from the claims
referenced above is $1,346,531.16. We have enclosed for your use the
claim information for these two retiews. Please pay careful attention to the
cover memo to this claim information, as it describes some important
elements of the process.
In order to expedite and simplify this matter, we are extending to all
hospitals the opportunity to settle before litigation. Any settlement at this
juncture -will save both your institution and the federal Government the
burden and expense of litigation, and vill provide the hospital an
opportunity to resolve this issue on a lasting basis.
The settlement agreement which ve are offering is enclosed. Asyou
will note, it requires that your hospital implement measures to curb the
submission of duplicate claims, to make a reasonable effort to repay
beneficiaries the amount of copayments and deductibles that they vere
required to expend due to your submission of duplicate claims and to pay
civil damages, through December 31, 1991, in the amount of S58,26082.
The agreement also contains compliance measures and provisions for the
reimbursement of more recent duplicate payments, without penalties, so
that this entire issue can be resolved.
If you would like to settle this case before litigation, please contact
the undersigned, in writing, at the address indicated within twenty (20)
days of the date of this letter. It will not be necessary at that time to enter
into the final agreement. We are only seeking a good faith indication on
your part that the hospital will consider settlement When such an
1996]
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indication is provided, the hospital may take an additional 30 days to sign
and return the signed agreement with the initial payment. If we do not hear
from you, we will assume you are not interested in a pre-filing s-.ttlement
and will proceed to file the necessary legal action in the appropriate United
States District Court through which we will seek the maximum recovery
authorized by law.




Assistant United States Attorney
Assistant U.S. Attorney
This letter resembles a true copy of a settlement demand letter issued
by the United States Department of Justice. However, the name of the
hospital is changed and the fictitious name of North Community Hospital
is used. Additionally, the number of false claims, the amount of total
potential damages, and the settlement offer are altered from their original
form.
The demand letter calls for a total settlement of $58,260.82.
Considering the cost of litigation and the total liability exposure of
$1,346,531.16, the settlement offer appears attractive. Additionally,
entering into the settlement agreement avoids any extensive records
investigations or subpoenas duces tecum. Furthermore, the parties to the
settlement agreement acknowledge that, because of the volume of
Medicare claims submitted and the variety of clinical circumstances to
which the rule for billing outpatient services may be applicable, it is likely
that erroneous claims will be submitted by the institution subsequent to the
effective date of the agreement.
If an institution implements certain minimum measures pursuant to a
settlement agreement, the U.S. will deem any incorrect claim submitted
subsequent to the effective date of the agreement to have been
Vol. :1
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"inadvertent," rather than submitted with "deliberate ignorance" or with
"reckless disregard." The minimum measures that the institution must
implement include either appropriate computer software, manual pre-
submission review, or an optional post-submission testing process.
It is unclear whether an institution will be afforded some type of
"prosecutorial immunity" if it implements any of the above minimum
measures sua sponte prior to settling a specific claim with the DOJ.
Implementation of the minimum measures could buttress the argument that
any erroneous claims were submitted with "negligence" or as an "innocent
mistake," as opposed to with "deliberate ignorance" or with "reckless
disregard." That is, if the Government is unable to prove the knowledge
element of a False Claims cause of action, it has "no case" notwithstanding
the formal extension (or lack thereof) of any "immunity" from prosecution.
Recall, however, that the typical Government settlement offer., at least in
the context of the seventy-two hour window project, is "sweet" enough to
extinguish any temptation to resist the allegation.
Medical Device Billing Fraud
The medical device fraud investigative effort is directed at "recouping"
DRG reimbursement for procedures involving investigational cardiac
devices not yet fully approved by the FDA. Generated from a qui tam
lawsuit still under seal as of this writing, the general allegation is that 132
U.S. hospitals submitted improper bills for procedures involving the use of
unapproved investigational medical devices.97
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") issued manual provisions in July 1986 indicating that procedures
calling for the use of investigational devices were not "reasonable and
necessary" and were not reimbursable by Medicare.1 The Government,
therefore, contends that claims for these procedures constitute violations
of the False Claims Act.
19 Mustokoff, supra note 47, at 13.
7 BNA, Sutter Mfemorial to Pay S1.3 Million to Settle.Aedical Device Fraud Ch arges, 4 B% A
HEALTH CARE POLY REP. 9 (Feb. 26, 1996)(citing U.S, ex re. v. Healthv et Regional Medica
Center et aL (D.C. Wash, filed Mar. 31, 1994).
"s SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SUMER, at 2.
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It should be noted that regulations, effective November 1, 1995, set
forth the process by which the FDA will assist HCFA in identifying non-
experimental investigational devices that may be reimbursable under
Medicare."9 However, the enforcement effort focuses on the period from
1988 to 1994. Of the 132 institutions involved in the lawsuit and
investigation, only Sutter Memorial Hospital of Sacramento, California has
entered into a settlement agreement that dismisses it from the pending
20action.
Obtaining a dismissal with prejudice from the pending administrative
and civil proceedings, Sutter agreed to pay the United States
$1,265,487.2' Pursuant to the settlement contract, the fine payable is not
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 2 In addition to the monetary settlement,
Sutter agreed to undertake a course of action to prevent fraud and false
billing to Medicare.03 Compliance directives contained in settlement
agreements of this nature, while not holding the force of law, may provide
general guidance in terms of implementing compliance measures for other
institutions in the industry.
The specific compliance provisions generally mandate education and
training for bill submission for new and existing physicians and staff, the
development and dissemination of an official institutional policy for
accurate claims submission, confidential disclosure channels for employees,
and expanded the Government's inspection rights on books, records, and
other company documents and supporting materials. 24
With the applicable laws identified, and the relevant Government
investigations recognized, the health care institution is appropriately
'" 60 Fed. Reg. 48417 et. seq. (Sep. 19, 1995).
20 BNA, supra note 194.
201 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SUTTER.
202 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2), (7) (1995).
7 SETTLEMENTAGREEMENT SUTrER ("Sutter undertakes on behalf of itself and its subsidiaries
to pursue the following course of action from the effective date of this Agreement to prevent fraud,
abuse and false billing to Medicare by Sutter, its subsidiaries, its employees, its staf physicians, and
third parties whose services are ordered, or certified as medically necessary, by Sutter personnel").
204 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SLITTER.
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situated to begin designing a formal compliance program."" Formal
compliance programs and their application to health care entities are
discussed below.
CLARIFYING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
With regard to medical claims submission to the Government, a formal
compliance program is simply a set of corporate policies that mandate
institutional regulatory compliance designed in a manner to detect and
prevent legal violations." 6 The general underlying goals of a compliance
program are to deter corporate internal misconduct and to provide
channels for internal policing and reporting malfeasance. 7 Indeed, the
"hallmark of an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law
is that the organization exercised due diligence in seeking to prevent and
detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents." '
The policy directives should clearly state the permissible bounds of
employee conduct, and these directives should be tempered with a
sensitivity for the general nature of the business and applicable industry
standards.2"9 The preamble to the policy recitation should contain a
general disclaiming statement that employee conduct in derogation of
company policy is beyond the scope of the employee's authority."' 0 Such
a statement may be used as an argument against the application of
' Although it is beyond the scope of this article, other industries may find corporate comphance
efforts appropriate and useful. Furthermore, the health care compliance efforts di:eu_:zd here are
focusing on ensuring accurate claims submission. Compliance efforts directed at other lava; lie
antitrust or environmental regulations may also be appropriate.
... See Queen & Frasher, supra note 126, at 2.
... Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 18, at 645.
..S U.S.S.G. § SA1.2, comment (n.3(k)).
Walsh & Prich, supra note 15, at 647; Webb and Molo, supra note 11, at 391 (quoting Davis
S. Maehlo-witz, Making a Compliance Program Work .A Practical Guide, AM. L W., ,r. 1992,
at 16 ("[Write policies and procedures in the style of the USA Today, not the Harvard Law Rciaw.);
Richard J. Mlackaury, Compliance Programs Under the Robinson-Patman Act and OthcrAntitrust
Law - The PracticalEffect of Such Programs or thc Absence Thereof, 37 ANTITRUST LI. 9 5, 9S
(. _.) (stating that an effective compliance policy will be "something a zale:man can read and
understand").
"1 Webb and Molo, supra note 11, at 390 (citing Karl A. Grozkaufrnanis, Corporate Compliance
Programs as a MiigatingFactor, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 5.0S11 (Jed S. Rak-offed.,
1993).
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corporate liability in a civil or criminal context.2 ' The most important
factor with respect to developing a compliance program is that the
institution must be reasonably capable of enforcing its compliance policies.
A skeletal framework for the foundation of a compliance program can
be derived from the Sentencing of Organizations section of the United
States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual. Taken to an extreme,
ignorance of these Guidelines by a General Counsel may constitute
malpractice. 212 In order to be operating under an "effective program," the
organization must exercise due diligence in pursuing prevention and
detection of criminal conduct.213 The program is not necessarily
"ineffective" if it fails to prevent or detect a particular offense. 214
However, "[d]ue diligence requires the organization to take the following
types (emphasis added) of steps:"
The organization must have established compliance standards and
procedures to be followed by its employees and other agents that
are reasonably capable of reducing the prospect of criminal
conduct. 5
Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel of the
organization must have been assigned overall responsibility to
oversee compliance with such standards and procedures.216
The organization must have used due care not to delegate
substantial discretionary authority to individuals whom the
organization knew, or should have known through the exercise of
due diligence, had a propensity to engage in illegal activities.217
2" "In derogation of company policy" arguments are unlikely to succeed.
212 Webb and Molo, supra note 11, at 375 (citing Michele Galen, Keeping the LongArm ofthe
Law at Arm's Length, BUS WK., Apr. 22, 1991, at 104 (quoting Professor John C. Coffee of
Columbia University)).
213 U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(k)).
214 Id.
215 U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(kXl)).
216 U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(k)(2)).
217 U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(kX3)).
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* The organization must have taken steps to communicate effectively
its standards and procedures to all employees and other agents, e.g.,
by requiring participation in training programs or by disseminating
publications that explain in a practical manner what is required.21
* The organization must have taken reasonable steps to achieve
compliance with its standards, e.g., by utilizing monitoring and
auditing systems reasonably designed to detect criminal conduct by
its employees and other agents and by having in place and
publicizing a reporting system whereby employees and other agents
could report criminal conduct by others within the organization
without fear of retribution.21 9
* The standards must have been consistently enforced through
appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, including, as appropriate,
discipline of individuals responsible for the failure to detect an
offense. Adequate discipline of individuals responsible for an
offense is a necessary component of enforcement; however, the
form of discipline that will be appropriate will be case specific. )
* After an offense has been detected, the organization must have
taken all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the offense
and to prevent further similar offenses -- including any necessary
modifications to its program to prevent and detect violations of
law.221
Viewed generally, these guidelines can be categorized as either policy
development and delegation of authority, education, auditing and
monitoring, or reporting and discipline. An institution may wish to
incorporate other specific compliance strategies in addition to those types
suggested by these guidelines.'m  Several advantages and some
218 U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(k)(4)).
219 U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n3(k)(5)).
220 U.S.S.G. § SA1.2, comment (n.3(k)(6)).
221 U.S.S.G. § SA1.2, comment (n.3(k)(7)).
'2 BNA, HCFA Takeslfore Acthe Role in Combatting Fraudulent Claims, 5 BNA HEALTH L.
REP. 507 (Apr. 4,1996)X"Other preventative compliance strategies health care organizations may want
to incorporate include: conducting their ownm internal re-views or audits or employer compcn=ation,
related party costs, and billing procedures; retaining experts for accounting and medical reiews,
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disadvantages exist relative to implementation of a formal compliance
program. While these factors should be considered, the discussion below
demonstrates that positive attributes of a program outweigh the negative
considerations. It is clear from the discussion that an institution
undergoing a governmental investigation will realize greater success if it
has implemented an "effective compliance program."
The numerous benefits of implementing a corporate compliance
program, as opposed to the steps required for development and
implementation, are clear and unambiguous. As a threshold matter, the
organization should realize that a self-imposed program will not contain all
the harsh provisions of a government-imposed program. If the entity
enters into a settlement agreement with the Government to settle a health
care fraud claim, a compliance program will inevitably be a condition in the
agreement unless such program is already in place."z
While it is hopeful that one of the benefits achieved by a compliance
program is elimination of corporate wrongdoing, another significant benefit
is the substantial reduction in monetary penalties that may be realized if an
"effective compliance program" is in place.224 Nevertheless, if an
organization is operating primarily for criminal purposes or by criminal
means, the court must set a fine that is of sufficient amount "to divest the
organization of all its net assets." 5
If an organization is not operating primarily for criminal purposes or
by criminal means, the guidelines provide a set of procedures for
determining the fine. 6 Generally, the court determines the base fine?,7
calculates the culpability score,8 determines the fine rangF9 by using
minimum and maximum multipliers,"0 and then sets a fine within the
centralizing contract review and approval to detect improper remuneration for referrals or provision
of free services; and conducting internal quality assurance reviews").
2.3 BNA, supra note 10, ("If a company is found to have violated fraud and abuse statutes, a
'draconian' corporate compliance plan likely vill be imposed by the federal Government...").
24 See U.S.S.G. § 8C.
225 U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1.
226 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4.
227 Id.
2n U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5.
n9 U.S.S.G. §8C2.7.
2'0 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.6.
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range. 2 1
The base fine is calculated by taking the greatest of the amount from
the Offense Level Fine Table,"2 the monetary gain to the organization,23
or the loss that was caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by the
organization. 4 The culpability score starts with five points, then the
score increases or decreases after the consideration of "altering factors'.
Altering factors that may increase the culpability score generally include
the size of the organization, the organization's involvement in or tolerance
of the activity, the historical conduct of the organization, whether the
entity violated a court order, and whether the institution obstructed
justice. 6 An altering factor that will decrease the culpability score is the
presence of an effective compliance program 37 If the organization has an
effective program in place, three points may be subtracted from the
culpability score." s
After determining the culpability score, the court determines the fine
range by multiplying the base fine by the maximum and minimum
multipliers. Finally, a fine is selected within the fine range based upon
various factors that generally attempt to pinpoint the seriousness of the
offense within the applicable range."
A practical example best demonstrates the reducing effect that an
effective compliance program can have on criminal fines. Consider again
North Community Hospital (NCH). Without considering the relevant
offense, assume that NCH has been convicted of an offense that has an
"Offense Level" of 25. The applicable fine for an "Offense Level' of 25
is $2,800,000. If the starting "Culpability Score" is 5, and no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance applies, then the "Minimum Multiplier" is one
and the "Maximum Multiplier" is two. Therefore, the fine range is from
$2,800,000 to $5,600,000. However, if NCH had an "effective compliance
2" U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8.
232 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4(aX1),(d).
-3 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4(aX2).
- U.S.S.G. § 8C2A(aX3).
"5 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(a).
2' U.S.S.G. §8C2.5(b)-(e).
27 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f).
23 Id
239 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8(aXl)-(10).
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program" in place, then the "culpability score" is reduced to two, the
"Minimum Multiplier" is four, and the "Maximum Multiplier" is eight.
With the compliance program, the applicable fine range is from $1,120,000
to $2,240,000. Therefore, ifNCH had an "effective compliance program"
in place, it would realize a fine reduction ranging from $1,680,000 to
$3,360,000.
As stated previously, the Government may not seek criminal
prosecution due to the ease with which it can bring a claim under the Civil
False Claims Act. However, under the False Claims Act, a compliance
program does not help reduce criminal fines. Nevertheless, several other
valuable benefits may accrue to the organization as a result of the
implementation of an effective compliance program.
The most successful compliance programs will undermine the ability
of employees to bring claims under the False Claims Act as qui tam
relators. An effective compliance program requires "publicizing a
reporting system whereby employees and other agents could report
criminal conduct."24 An employee may therefore feel compelled to
comply with company policy and bring any perceived misconduct to the
attention of the management before the questioned conduct is reported to
the Government. By implementing a compliance program, the qui tam
plaintiff will be unable to "claim the moral high ground by asserting that
[his] employer [was] ... indifferent to quality control." '241
Moreover, while the aim of the compliance program might be to avoid
fraudulent submission of Part A Medicare claims, implementation may
create a heightened employee awareness of the billing process that can
result in realizing economies of scale or other efficiencies. The heightened
awareness of the billing process can result in general cost savings and
possibly prompt realization of practices that result in actual under-billing.
The educational and reporting mechanisms may provide a system by which
management and staff can communicate with each other and respond
quickly to lawsuits and investigations.24 Furthermore, the development of
a corporate compliance program may promote a positive corporate image
240 U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(kX5)).
241 Queen & Frasher, supra note 126, at 25.
242 Webb & Molo, supra note 11, at 377.
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in the eyes of the general public, potential donors, and bondholders." 3
Disadvantage of Program Implementation
If there are negative implications associated with developing a compliance
program, they pale in comparison to the numerous benefits that should
accrue. There are two primary disadvantages associated with
implementing a compliance program.2'
The first disadvantage is that a compliance program may actually
encourage a prosecutor to bring a criminal or civil action under certain
circumstances. For instance, the presence of a compliance policy that is
not fully implemented or enforced can be deadly. The program's
parameters may provide a benchmark against which a prosecutor will argue
that a corporation was "reckless" by not enforcing its own compliance
program. The prosecutor in a Civil False Claims action might argue that
an entity had "knowledge" that it was filing false claims because it had a
compliance program. That is, if it were not filing false claims, it would not
have developed a policy to combat the problem.245 The plan will either be
deemed "non-effective" at sentencing, or will be used by the prosecutor as
evidence that a standard was not met.246 The second disadvantage is the
possibility that damaging evidence will be generated over the course of
developing a compliance program. Despite the possible negative
implications of implementation, the "better course of action" is to develop
and enforce an "effective compliance program.""24
43 Id ("[Tihe dissemination of a positive corporate ethos that deters miceonduct ultimately save-
a company money").
244 Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630,636 (6th Cir. 1987) (concluding that e.xual haracs-ment
was foreseeable, the court noted that had it not been, Avco would not have had a policy attempting to
deal xith it).
2" Dan K. Webb et aL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS § 16.04[1], at 16-11 (citing
Principles ofFederal Prosecution, at 9-27.110).
246 Id. § 16.04[1][a] ("Factors considered in determining %,hether a substantial federal interest
would be served include: Federal law enforcement priorities, the nature and scrioune-ss of the offene,
the deterrent effect of prosecution, the corporation's culpability in connection %,with the offence, the
entity's history of criminal activity, the corporation's level of coop eration in the Government's
prosecution, and the likely sentence or other consequences if the pezron is convicted'),
247 Id §16.04[1][b] (discussing in what jurisdiction the defendant is most likely to l:a appropriately
punished).
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PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
The steps required for development of an "effective compliance program"
can be brief, confusing and ambiguous. The precise actions necessary for
an effective compliance program vary depending on the size of the
organization, the likelihood that certain offenses may occur because of the
nature of the business, and the history of the organization.24 The entity
should have in place a general two-step process in which to create a
program to prevent and detect violations of the law. The general two-step
process should be conducted pursuant to a board resolution or a directive
from senior management.249 The first general step in the process is
conducting a "preliminary compliance program review."2" ' The second
general step is the development and implementation of the plan.
The Preliminary Compliance Program Review
The purpose of conducting a preliminary compliance program review
(hereinafter "audit") is to gauge current compliance with the law, identify
areas that are ripe for change, and to estimate current liability exposure.
The preliminary audit should be defined in terms of scope, who will
oversee the audit, what areas will be audited, and what mechanisms will be
applied to ensure application of the attorney-client privilege and the
attorney work product doctrine.25 ' The general nature of the audit should
be with an eye toward complying with the law in the future, as opposed to
excavating the past in an attempt to uncover fraudulent practices.
The scope of the audit, who will oversee the audit, and who will be
audited will fluctuate depending on which practices of the organization are
analyzed. Furthermore, the specific laws that the compliance program will
address will effect the nature of the audit. The most important aspect of
conducting the preliminary audit is ensuring that an attorney-client
privilege is preserved or that the protection of the work product doctrine
24 Id. § 16.04[l][c].
249 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 18, at 670 (citing 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 35,399 (July 1, 1991)).
0 Id. at 671.
2" 48 C.F.R. § 203.7001 (1995).
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is available. The organization may also attempt to invoke the "self-
evaluative" privilege. However, the "self-evaluative" privilege has not
survived Government's attempts to obtain internal audit reports."2
The general rule for the attachment of an attorney-client privilege is
that confidential communications are privileged if they are made in
confidence, between a client or potential client and a lawyer, and are made
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. 3 The work product doctrine
protects against the disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions made in
anticipation of litigation.2"4
In terms of conducting a preliminary internal review, general counsel
or outside counsel should generally oversee the audit to maximize the
potential for full employee disclosure."z 5 Both inside and outside counsel
may direct the audit in such a manner that maximizes the protection of the
attorney-client privilege. Inside counsel may be more sensitive to
peculiarities of the institution in terms of conducting business, whereas
outside counsel may be in a position to render valuable advice based on its
experience with corporate compliance. While cost may also be an issue,
outside counsel should be used if possible to eliminate the Government's
argument that inside counsel rendered unprotected business advice, as
opposed to protected legal advice.
In formulating a preliminary review plan, counsel may wish to retain
the services of an independent audit consultant. Communications between
the client and an agent of the attorney will be protected if all requirements
for the privilege are satisfied and the agent was necessary or beneficial to
"2 Dan K. Webb et al., supra note 244, at 16-25.
23 Id
" See discussion, supra p. 4.
2S United States v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972),ccrt denicd, (ho!ding
the corporation criminally liable for the actions of a low-level cmploce depite the fLct that the
employee's conduct was generally and specifically prohibited by the corporation) 469 US, 1125
(1973);Butcf Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, ISS F.2d 2,8 (6th Cir. 1946) (ho!ding that the
company-was not criminally liab!e for its salesman's Niolation of a War Production Board order b-cauze
it "would carry corporate responsibility beyond the holding in any caae v.hich haz icen cited and
beyond the boundary to which we think corporate criminal responsibility should be carricd,).
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the attorney in rendering legal advice.256 Indeed, the audit consultant may
possess unique intelligence relative to industry practice, an item which
must be considered under the Sentencing Guidelines.2"7 Therefore,
communications made between an independent auditor and counsel are
protectable under the attorney-client privilege.
However, if an independent consultant is used in the preliminary
review phase, they should not be retained to assist in the prospective
implementation phase of the compliance effort. If the consultant was
retained to assist in all aspects of the development of the program, then an
organization would be seeking unprotected accounting or consulting
advice, as opposed to protected legal advice, potentially leaving the audit
or audit findings unprotected.2"8
In terms of conducting the preliminary review, it is recommended that
organization abstain from documenting or memorializing findings. If an
organization insists on conducting a formal review, the guidelines below
should be followed:
" A memo should be created that requests legal advice.
* Employees should be notified in writing that counsel vill contact
them.
* An attorney should generally supervise all phases of the audit.
* Experts or investigators should report to counsel for diection and
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 18, at 664-665 (citing Robert E. Bloch, Compliance Programs
and CriminalAntitrstLitigation: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 57 ANTITRUST L. J. 223, 226 (1988)
("The basic question is whether the existence of a corporate compliance program is legally relevant
in determining corporate liability. In my judgment, the answer is no"); John H. Shenefield & Richard
J. Favertto, Compliance Programs as Viewedfrom the Antitrust Division, 48 ANTITRUST L, J. 73,
79 (1979) ("The existence of a corporate compliance program is, as a matter of law, irrelevant..").
217 FED R. EVID. 401.
" HanlesterNetwork v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (19._) (citing United States v. Beusch, 596
F2d 871,877-878 (19_)) ("Merely stating or publishing instructions and policies without diligently
enforcing them is not enough to place the acts of an employee who violates them outside the scope
of his employment"); United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (19_), cert, denied,
464 U.S. 956 (1983) (holding that the trial court properly allowed the jury to consider Basic
Construction's antitist compliance policy for the purpose of determining whether the employees were
acting for the benefit of the corporation).
[Vol. 1:1
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
oversight.
Mark all documents "Privileged and Confidential - Attorney Work
Product/Attorney-Client privileged."
* A separate file should be maintained by the attorney.
* Reports from witness interviews should only contain the mental
impressions of the attorney as opposed to witness quotes.
* Reports to management should be presented as legal advice.Y 9
In the course of conducting the preliminary review, it is likely that
instances of malfeasance or misconduct will be uncovered. Therefore, an
issue arises with respect to whether the institution should simply correct
the errant conduct or should fully disclose the discovery to the
Government.
Voluntary Disclosure
The issue of whether a health care entity should voluntarily disclose any
discovered misconduct arises frequently. The issue does not easily lend
itself to the application of a consistent, general rule. Each discovery
should be evaluated by counsel and the disclosure decision should be made
on a case-by-case basis.
If a health care entity discovers that it has been submitting "false"
claims for payment to the Government it could face penalties of up to
$10,000 per claim plus three times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains.26 However, if the entity furnishes Government
officials with all relevant information within thirty days of discovery, fully
cooperates with any Government investigation, and no prosecution or
investigation has commenced against the entity, the potential penalties are
reduced down to as little as double damages.26 In addition to its potential
2 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 18, at 666 n. 259.
" Webb & Molo, supra note 11, at 379.
261 Id.
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penalty reducing function under the False Claims Act, voluntary disclosure
may have a fine reducing effect under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Under the Guidelines, if the organization "(A) prior to an imminent
threat of disclosure or Government investigation; and (B) within a
reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense, reported the
offense to appropriate Governmental authorities, fully cooperated in the
investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative
acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct," then five points are
subtracted from the culpability score.262
In the example above, North Community Hospital (NCH) realized a
significant reduction in criminal fines because of the existence and
operation of its compliance program. Recall that NCH had already been
convicted of an offense with an "Offense Level" of twenty-five, and a
"Culpability Score" of five. Also recall that an "Offense Level" of twenty-
five carries with it a "Base Fine" of $2,800,000. The fine range for an
offense with an "Offense Level" of twenty-five and a "Culpability Score"
of 5 is $2,800,000 to $5,600,000. If NCH had discovered and properly
disclosed the misconduct to the Government, it could have reduced its
"Culpability Score" to zero. The "Minimum Multiplier" would have been
reduced to .05 and the "Maximum Multiplier" would have been reduced
to point twenty. Assuming proper voluntarily disclosure, -the fine range
would be between $140,000 and $560,000. Therefore, with voluntary
disclosure, NCH could realize a fine reduction ranging from $2,660,000 to
$5,040,000.
In addition to providing a penalty reducing effect, voluntary
disclosure plays into the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Voluntary
disclosure of misconduct may significantly influence a prosecutor not to
indict.263 Furthermore, defense contractors have experienced great success
262 Id.
263 U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(kXi)-(iii)) ("Among the relevant factors are: (i)Size of the
organization- The requisite degree of formality of a program to prevent and detect violations of law
will vary with the size of the organization: the larger the organization, the more formal the program
typically should be. A larger organization generally should have established written policies defining
the standards and procedures to be followed by its employees and other agents; (ii) Likelihood that
certain offenses may occur because of the nature of its business - If because of the nature of an
organization's business there is a substantial risk that certain types of offenses may occur, management
must have taken steps to prevent and detect those types of offenses. For example, if an organization
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under the Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program. 4
In 1989, seventy-three companies disclosed 164 instances of criminal
conduct. Of the 164 instances, only nine were prosecuted with eight being
instances in which the Government had evidence of malfeasance prior to
disclosure.265 Currently, there is no voluntary disclosure program in place
for hospitals that resembles the Department of Defense program.
However, the HHS Inspector General, has expressed an interest in
developing a similar disclosure program to the one she established while
she was the Defense Department Inspector General'C5
The incentive to voluntarily disclose is significant at least in terms of
a monetary reduction in penalties. Furthermore, prosecutorial discretion
provides an incentive to voluntarily disclose. However, each disclosure
should be considered carefully by counsel on a case-by-case basis prior to
making any disclosures to the Government. Having conducted a
preliminary review and having assessed any voluntary disclosure
possibilities, the organization is ready to prospectively address the
handles toxic substances, it must have established standards and procedures designed to ensure that
those substances are properly handled at all times. If an organization employ, c-ales por-onnel vho
have flexibility in setting prices, it must have established standards and procedures designed to ensure
that those substances are properly handled at all times. If an organization employ fale, perzonnel who
have flexibility in setting prices, it must have established standards and procedures designed to prevent
and detect price-fixing. If an organization employs sales personnel who have flcxibility to represent
the material characteristics of a product, it must have established standards and prc~edure; de-igned
to prevent fraud; (ii) Prior history of the organization - An organization's prior history may indicate
types of offenses that it should have taken actions to prevent. Recurrence of misconduct similar to the
which an organization has previously committed casts doubt on whether it took all reaconable step:
to prevent such misconduct
An organization's failure to incorporate and follow applicable industry practice or the standards
called for by any applicable governmental regulation weighs against a finding of an effective program
to prevent and detect violations of law").
'" Queen & Frasher, supra note 126, at 33 ("A board rezolution...documents the date on vhich
your organization committed itself to creating a comprehensive compliance program ... .[f your
organization is implicated in vwongdoing before completion to the program, you can at least argue that
your good intentions vere not merely in response to Government's inveigation.The resolution is
the first step in extending the attorney-client privilege to the entire process of compliance program
design. The resolution should expressly identify the purpose of the legal representation as securing
legal advice for use in creation and implementation of a corporate compliance program"),
265 Antitrust Risks and Compliance Procedures, MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE
1994 § 1.019 (1994) (offering that the term "preliminary compliance program reviev be used as
opposed to the term "audit").
26 Queen & Frasher, supra note 126, at 41.
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installation and application of its compliance program.
Considerations for Program Implementation
The directive from senior management or the board resolution to develop
a compliance program should have provided for the assembly of a duly
qualified "compliance committee." Counsel should be present at all
meetings of the committee to ensure that the committee is creating an
"effective compliance program" and to "render legal advice." In addition,
counsel should apprise the committee of ongoing developments in the law,
respond to specific legal questions from the committee, respond to reports
of program violations, and assess voluntary disclosure if misconduct is
discovered. All members of the committee should consider the
peculiarities of the health care industry as the program is developed. That
is, while the Sentencing Guidelines provide a framework for development
of the program, they were not designed with health care institutions in
mind.
In the context of claims submission, the individual chairing the
committee should preferably be a physician that serves a dual
medical/management role. This type of chairperson fully understands the
business environment in which the hospital operates as well as the route of
the medical chart from patient visit to claim submission. Depending on the
size of the committee, the organization may wish to promulgate its
compliance plan utilizing sub-committees. The committee should at least
address policy development and delegation of authority, education,
auditing and monitoring, and prevention, reporting and discipline.
Counsel should generally abstain from involvement in the
development of written policies, except for legal review and analysis. For
example, counsel is probably not qualified to develop a policy for what
constitutes a "key portion" of a medical procedure. Additionally, as a
counsel's role becomes more of a management role and less of a legal
advisor, any attorney-client privilege may be jeopardized. When an
attorney is rendering both legal and business advice, courts will extend the
privilege if legal advice was the predominant aspect of the
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communication. 7
Policy Development and Delegation of Authority
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines charge that compliance standards and
procedures be developed that are "reasonably capable of reducing the
prospect of criminal conduct."'2 s The policies developed by the committee
or sub-committee must be narrowly-tailored to specifically identified
problem areas in order to be capable of reducing the possibility of legal
violations. The phrase "[i]t is the policy of this hospital to ensure that all
claims submitted to the Government for payment will comply with all laws
and regulations" is probably insufficient to satisfy the requirement.
However, in the context of the "physical presence" requirement it is
probably sufficient to implement a policy that "all teaching physicians
submitting part B claims to Medicare for services in which a resident
assisted in the provision of the service must be physically present during
the key portion of the procedure."
In terms of policy oversight, "high-level" personnel of the
organization must be assigned supervisory responsibility. "9 "High-level
personnel of the organization" includes a director, an executive officer, an
individual in charge of a major business or functional unit of the
organization, such as sales, administration, or finance.""70 Effectively, this
means that oversight may be the responsibility of anyone who has the
authority and ability to exercise substantial control over a particular
function.
In terms of compliance with claims submission rules, oversight should
be the responsibility of high level personnel within a medical records
division. Documentation is a key factor in submitting an accurate claim to
2"7 Thomas IV. Hyland and Molly Hood Craig, Attorncy-Client Privilege and Mork-Product
Doctrine in the Corporate Setting, DEF. COUNS. J., Oct 1995, at 561 (citing Vincent C, Aexandcr,
The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JO-NS L. REV. 191,
338, n.490-491 (1989)).
" U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(k)(1)).
269 U.S.S.G. § SA1.2, comment (n.3(k)(2)).
270 U.S.S.G. § SA1.2, comment (n.3(k)(b)), § SC2.5, comment (n3).
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the Government, and medical records personnel will best understand the
path of a medical chart and its notations.
In terms of screening current and prospective employees and agents,
the organization must exercise due care in delegating substantial authority
to individuals who have a propensity to engage in illegal activities." This
guideline requires at a minimum that the institution conduct background
checks of individuals who will exercise substantial authDrity. In the
context of claims submission, this group would likely include all high-level
managers in departments related to billing, physicians and any other
employee or agent involved in submitting a bill to the Government for
payment.
In the health care context, the classification of individuals who are
delegated substantial authority likely includes third-party billing
consultants. Third-party billing consultants that are compensated based on
a percentage of revenues or revenue increases should be eliminated from
an institution's claims submission process. At the very least, compensation
paid to billing consultants should reflect an hourly rate or an appropriate
flat fee. If the billing consultant is compensated based on a percentage of
revenue from Medicare Claims, it is likely that the consultant would have
the "propensity to engage in illegal activity" by "gaming" the Medicare
reimbursement system.272
Removing third party billing consultants from the submission process
is also consistent with the overall compliance charge of exercising "due
diligence in seeking to prevent and detect criminal conduct" by employees
and other agents." While billing consultants may be extremely proficient
in maximizing reimbursement on behalf of health care organizations, they
also may attract the attention of Government investigators or prosecutors.
Metzinger Associates, a New Jersey-based billing consultant, was charged
with causing over 180 hospitals in 17 different states to submit false claims.
Following an investigation of Metzinger, the Government announced its
intention to analyze each client-hospital's billing practices to ensure
27 U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(kX3)).
272 Eugene W. Lorenz and Marleeta K. Jones, ST. ANTHONYS DRG GUIDEBOOK 1996, at
V (stating that billing consultants are likely to exhibit practices consistent with thc book's "Keys to a
Financially Successful DRG Program" which include decreasing the length of stay, decreasing
resource utilization, discharging a patient "early," and increasing the number of p-cadmission tests).
[Vol. 1:1
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
compliance with the law,273 suggesting that if the hospitals implemented a
policy to internalize all claim submission procedures, the Government
investigators would not be paying a visit.
Education
"Education requires that the organization must have taken steps to
communicate effectively its standards and procedures to all employees and
other agents[.] ' 74 It can be reasoned that "communicate effectively"
means requiring attendance at all educational sessions and disseminating
publications that explain compliance requirements in a practical manner.2"
Put simply, education should accomplish the goal of notifying and
explaining how the new policies function and how they will be
implemented.
New and existing employees should be required to attend an
educational seminar. If an individual fails to satisfy the attendance
requirement within the time period (with reasonable opportunities to
attend), they should be required to fund the training at their own expense
and on their own time. If the attendance requirement is not satisfied within
a required time, billing privileges should be suspended. Recall that part of
the requirement for an "effective compliance program" is that it is
"reasonably enforced." Requiring attendance with graduated penalties for
failure to attend should ensure full attendance by all those whose
attendance is required.
The key to a successful educational program is to implement a
uniform, systematic, institution-wide training course. Piecemeal, sporadic,
informal "meetings" will likely be insufficient in terms of satisfying the "due
diligence" requirement.
Auditing and Monitoring
z Mustokoff, supra note 47, at 14.
U.S.S.G. § SA .2, comment (n.3(k)(4)).
275 .
1996]
52 DePA UL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
In the context of claims submission compliance efforts, auditing and
monitoring represent what is likely the most costly component since hiring
or retaining new personnel to conduct these new functions will likely be a
necessity. However, centralizing all billing functions may facilitate periodic
reviews of claim submissions. In doing so, economies of scale may be
realized that result in cost savings to "subsidize" the additional labor
expenses.
In terms of reviewing physician billing practice patterns, the CPUP
settlement offers mechanical guidance. The compliance effort at CPUP
calls for an annual review of physicians' billing practices for outpatient
services. Each year, a sampling of every physician's charts will be reviewed
for billing compliance. The results of the review will be shared with the
physician and the physician's department chair. It should be noted that the
feedback at this stage also serves to satisfy the educational requirement of
the previous section.
If a physician is not found to be in full compliance on the first review,
additional review will be necessary where more charts are analyzed. If
after the second review it is determined the physician is in full compliance,
then the physician is reviewed again in ninety days after having some
proscribed educational counseling. If the physician is not in compliance
after this expanded review, then the physician must undergo a concurrent
review. Concurrent review requires a review of every bill submitted for
payment for a period of thirty days and then until the physician is in
compliance for ten days. After completion of concurrent review, a follow-
up will be conducted after a ninety day period. While concurrent review
is a costly proposition, the expense is borne by the monitored physician.
Although not absolutely necessary, institutions should also consider
retaining an outside auditor to conduct an annual or bi-annual review to
ensure claims submission compliance. Claims that are submitted are the
pinnacle of a compliance program. The claim is what the Government will
review before deciding which entities to investigate and prosecute.
Auditors need to recognize what the Government looks for in deciding
who should be investigated. Some red flags might be a physician who bills
Medicare every day of the calendar year, a physician who submitted bills
while on vacation, or a physician who consistently bills at a level that is
high in complexity. An organization contemplating compliance may also
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wish to consider the possibility of a post-submission testing process.
Prevention, Reporting Misconduct, and Discipline
Under the guidelines, an "effective compliance program" must include a
publicized "reporting system whereby employees and other agents could
report criminal conduct by others within the organization without fear of
retribution." If auditing and monitoring represents the most daunting task,
this is perhaps the simplest. All that is necessary is designating a phone
line as the "reporting" line and publicizing its existence to employees. It
is also recommended that a separate phone line be dedicated to answering
billing questions that may arise.
In terms of reporting misconduct, the legal office is perhaps best
positioned to monitor the phone line. An organization will want a quick
legal review of the reported information to determine if a significant legal
problem exists. The individual reporting should have the choice of
remaining anonymous, or of disclosing his or her identity. If an individual
has specific billing questions, the finance department or a unit of finance is
probably best situated to competently answer complex procedural
questions.
In order to properly function, the compliance program must have
teeth. The guidelines require that "standards must have been consistently
enforced through appropriate disciplinary mechanisms., 276 An institution
should guard against limiting disciplinary actions in terms of their
character. For example, only using the threat of revocation or suspension
of staff privileges as potential punishments is probably insufficient. A
minor billing error should not, and would not, result in a physician being
stripped of his or her livelihood. Minor billing errors, however, should not
go unpunished. The punishment simply needs to be tempered and
structured to fit the offense.
CONCLUSION
276 US.S.G. § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(k)(6)).
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Notwithstanding its budgetary constraints, the Federal Government is
aggressively pursuing health care fraud cases. In its program, the
Government has selected the Civil False Claims Act as its weapon of
choice. As investigations and prosecutions proliferate, a health care entity
can best protect itself by developing and implementing a corporate
compliance program.
Influencing entities to engage in compliance efforts should represent
a valued public policy. However, the lack of clarity embodied in the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines will represent a barrier to compliance
participation. It is imperative that the DOJ, the HCFA, and the OIG
coordinate, develop, and issue an enforcement policy statement. The
statement should include the minimum necessary steps for a health care
compliance program.
An official position announced by the Government would provide an
incentive for entities to develop formal compliance programs. Subsequent
to issuing policy statements in the past, the Government has experienced
success with defense Contractors and entities attempting to comply with
environmental regulations.
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